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Gianluca Santilli

26 July 2024
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2959
Details
Abstract
In the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis, the question of who should bear the burden of banking crises has been a cornerstone of the new supervisory framework in Europe. We evaluate the bail-in regulation (BRRD) for bank bond holdings using a proprietary database covering holdings of all euro-denominated securities. We focus on hard-to-value bailinable bank bonds and show that banks increased their holdings of bailinable bank bonds while households and non-financial corporations reduced their holdings of bailinable bonds issued by riskier banks.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

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