

# Measuring Mortgage Availability & Take-Up

## An application to Macro-Prudential Policy

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<sup>1</sup>The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Central Bank of Ireland.



# Motivation

- Prior to financial crisis, pro-cyclical and ever-growing debt-capacity of home-owners.
- Post global financial crisis, Central Banks' have increasingly developed new and utilised existing macroprudential instruments.
  - Tool kits include both capital and **borrower-based** measures.
- The impact of these rules on credit supply and “how binding” they are for borrowers is important for instrument review
  - Infancy of the measures
  - Variation in their effectiveness

# Contribution

- **Contribution 1:** We illustrate pro-cyclicality of credit supply and the take-up of the available mortgage credit 2003-2018;
- **Contribution 2:** We illustrate the effect of macro-prudential stabilisers on credit availability and take-up;
- Our approach focuses on the cohort of draw-downs not on the unfulfilled demand (lack of supply); the focus here is on borrower credit constraints not the volume of mortgage credit.
- **Contribution 3:** Estimated Withdrawn Credit =  $X\beta * TE$ ;


# Firm IO to Mortgage Market



# Research Context


- Mortgage credit standards and heterogeneity of credit supply (Anenberg et al., 2017; Peydro' et al., 2017);
- Impact of MaP on the housing market (Cerutti et al., 2017; Lozej and O'Brien 2018; Van Bakkum et al., 2019);
- MaP and the Irish mortgage market (Kelly et al., 2018);

# Evolution of Irish House Prices and Credit Conditions



(a) Evolution of Irish House Prices

Source: Dallas FED International Housing Database



(b) Evolution of Credit Conditions

Source: LLD, Central Bank of Ireland



# MaP in Ireland

**Table:** Macroprudential Regulations for Mortgage Lending

2015/16	LTV Limit	<b>FTBs:</b> 90% Limit on house value up to 220k, 80% LTV applies above this value. <b>SSBs:</b> 80% Limit	Allowance: 10% of new PDH Lending
	LTI Limit	<b>FTBs:</b> 3.5 times gross income <b>SSBs:</b> 3.5 times gross income	Allowance: 20% of new PDH lending
2017	LTV Limit	<b>FTBs:</b> 90% Limit <b>SSBs:</b> 80% Limit	Allowance: 5% of new FTB lending 20% of new SSB lending
	LTI Limit	<b>FTBs:</b> 3.5 times gross income <b>SSBs:</b> 3.5 times gross income	Allowance: 20% of new PDH lending
2018/19	LTV Limit	<b>FTBs:</b> 90% Limit <b>SSBs:</b> 80% Limit	Allowance: 5% of new FTB lending 20% of new SSB lending
	LTI Limit	<b>FTBs:</b> 3.5 times gross income <b>SSBs:</b> 3.5 times gross income	Allowance: 20% of new FTB lending 10% of new SSB lending

Notes: Exemptions are granted for negative equity mortgages, switchers with no increase in balance and modifications of distressed mortgages. Loan-to-value of 90% up to house value of 220,000. Above 220,000, there is a maximum 80% loan-to-value for the portion above 220,000.

# Evolution of LTV and LTI (boom, bust and macro-pru)





# Data

- New Lending View:
  - LLD (2003-2014)
  - Monitoring Templates (2015-2018)
- LLD: All loans issued by Irish banks participating into 2011 Financial Measures Programme (over 90% of originations in mortgage market);
- Loan-origination data: loan-to-income, loan-to-value, loan interest rate/type, maturity, collateral information, borrower characteristics.

# Summary Statistics 2003 -2018

**Table:** Summary Statistics 2013 - 2018

Main Variables	Vbls. Mean and Std. Deviation (in parentheses)		
	2003-2008	2009-2013	2014-2018
Balance	206812.4 (96572.24)	189763.3 (90093.95)	222171.5 (129860.2)
Deposit	113899.4 (118689.8)	87934.91 (100680.1)	80542.97 (84681.29)
Rate	3.20 ( 1.83)	3.67 (.93)	3.41 (.62)
Income	62615.34 (29087.03)	62873.73 (31427.6)	80940.98 (40471.61)
Borrower Age	34.95 (8.03)	34.63 (7.63)	36.52 (6.83)
FTB share	.46 (.49)	.65 (.47)	.62 (.48)
Total	160,087	40,686	85,835

# No Allowance vs Allowance post 2015 (incl.)

**Table:** Mean Differences Between Allowance/No Allowance

	(Mean)NoAllowance	(Mean)Allowance
<b>MainVariables</b>		
overall balance	207,854.1 (121,812.8)	304,643.8 (144,487.6)
deposit	82,343.03 (86,633.87)	71,030.11 (64,347.66)
interest rate	3.28 (.41)	3.33 (.40)
income	80,178.19 (40,361.28)	86,731.31 (41,873.56)
FTB	64%	59%
borrower age	36.91 (7.07)	34.87 (5.33)
<b>N. Obs.</b>	<b>64,353</b>	<b>13,974</b>

Notes: Exemptions are granted for negative equity mortgages, switchers with no increase in balance and modifications of distressed mortgages. Loan-to-value of 90% up to house value of 220,000. Above 220,000, there is a maximum 80%

loan-to-value for the portion above 220,000.

# Stochastic frontier models

- Adaptation of production frontier to mortgage market:
  - Frontier: maximum attainable output, in this case, max credit;
  - Technical Efficiency: extent to which agents achieve max credit (take-up);

$$y_i = f(X_i, \beta) TE_i \exp(\nu_i)$$

$$0 < TE(y_i, X_i) \leq 1$$

## Empirical counterpart

Assuming that there are  $k$  inputs, that the production function is linear in logs and defining

$$u_i = -\ln(TE_i)$$

we obtain:

$$\ln(y_i) = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^k \beta_j \ln(x_{ji}) - u_i + \nu_i, i = 1, \dots, N$$

$$u_i \sim \mathcal{N}^+(\mu, \sigma_u^2)$$

$$\nu_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\nu^2)$$

# Our specification

- Model Specification
  - Dependent variable: Overall drawn balance
  - Credit Available:
    - Main inputs: income, downpayment
    - Factors impact credit conditions: borrower age, interest rate, FTB
    - Controls: bank id
  - Take-Up:
    - Main inputs: income, downpayment
    - Factors impact credit conditions: borrower age, interest rate, FTB
    - Controls: bank id
- Model 1: Pooled Cross Section
- Model 2: Pooled Cross Section with Time Interactions


# Static Coefficients

	Balance (in log)	Balance (in log)
Income	0.504*** (.0014)	0.74*** (.0016)
log deposit	0.045*** (.001)	0.04*** (.0007)
log age		-0.436*** (.003)
log rate		-0.055*** (.001)
FTB		-0.016*** (.0015)
constant	3.35*** (.005)	3.96*** (.011)
mu		
log deposit	.543*** (.005)	1.42*** (.054)
log income	-.764*** (.0098)	-.049*** (.025)
age		-2.83*** (.122)
rate		.267*** (.024)
FTB		-1.041*** (.047)
ilgtgamma	2.53*** (.014)	4.109*** (.0375)
lnsigma2	-.431*** (.012)	0.611*** (.039)
Bank FE	Yes	Yes
N	314,373	286,608

t statistics in parentheses


\* p < 0.10 \*\* p < 0.05 \*\*\* p < 0.01

# Static Coefficients






# Credit Availability and Take-up




a. Average Credit Available over Time




b. Average Take-up over Time

# Take-up




a. Take-up pre-/post- MaP



b. Take-up across groups

# Indicator



# Conclusions

- Impact of these MaPs on credit supply and “how binding” they are for borrowers is important for instrument review;
- Outline a methodology to estimate credit availability and the take-up:
  - Income leverage a main contributor to credit available in 03-07;
  - Take-up increased since introduction of MaP;
- Derived indicator of “binding”
  - Increased binding since 2014.
  - Large cross-sectional variation.
  - Almost 70% of FTBs in Dublin are using more than 90% of the credit available to them;

# Appendix